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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

18 November 1959

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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NO

Communist China - Indonesia:

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OK

The Chinese Embassy in Djakarta is demanding compensation for Chinese in West Java who were allegedly beaten)

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for resisting resettlement and is insisting that they be permitted to return to their homes. [redacted]

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[redacted] government will probably be forced in the end to acquiesce in the Indonesian measures, Peiping can be expected to continue its pressures in the hope of obtaining some moderation of the program.) [redacted]

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Iraq: Prime Minister Qasim's departure from the hospital on 17 November was greeted by a number of laudatory statements from Radio Baghdad. If demonstrations scheduled to celebrate his release are held, clashes between Communists and anti-Communists are likely despite tight security measures.

OK Support for the formation of a single political party led by Qasim is growing. All five army divisional commanders, three cabinet ministers, and nine provincial governors have endorsed the idea. The Communist press vigorously opposes the action, charging that it is a violation of "democratic principles." The middle-of-the road National Democrats take the same line, perhaps because they hope to become Qasim's chosen instrument. Its sponsors see the move as a device to limit Communist influence. Qasim has promised the renewal of political party activities by 6 January, and although he has remained silent on the issue, he may feel that a single party would eliminate present political rivalries. [redacted]

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N^o Guinea - Soviet Bloc: President Sekou Touré of Guinea is extending his current foreign tour, which has included official visits to the US, Britain, and West Germany, to the USSR and possibly to Czechoslovakia and East Germany. His apparently impromptu decision was probably influenced both by practical considerations and by a desire to demonstrate in dramatic fashion his continued adherence to a neutralist foreign policy. Such visits may lead to new bloc aid offers to Guinea. [redacted]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Peiping Increases Pressure on Djakarta Over Status
Of Overseas Chinese

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Chinese Em-
bassy is demanding compensation for Chinese in West Java who
were allegedly beaten for resisting resettlement and insists
that they be permitted to return to their homes.

Peiping will probably make further representations on be-
half of the Overseas Chinese. About 300,000 of an estimated
three million Chinese in Indonesia will be affected. Indonesian
Foreign Minister Subandrio, after an hour's meeting with the
Chinese ambassador on 17 November, indicated, however, that
both sides want to prevent permanent damage to hitherto friend-
ly relations. Subandrio brought the dispute into the open when
he told a press conference the interests of 80,000,000 Indone-
sians would not be sacrificed for "a small group of alien peo-
ple." He added, however, that Indonesia would carry through
with the resettlement program in areas where it was under way,
but in other areas would reconsider its implementation. Suban-
drio said that the Chinese ambassador, while asking Djakarta
to prevent more "excesses" in its implementation, expressed
readiness to support the program. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Peiping probably will be
compelled eventually to acquiesce in the Indonesian measures.

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

Support For Qasim-Led Single Iraqi Political Party Growing

The campaign for the formation of a single political party to be led by Prime Minister Qasim continues to gain support from influential Iraqis. The campaign, launched by a newspaper editor close to Qasim, has received the adherence of all five army divisional commanders, three cabinet ministers, and nine of Iraq's fourteen provincial governors. These influential supporters, none of whom are connected with any of the present political parties, probably view the one-party state as a means to curb Communist influence.

The Communists vigorously oppose the single-party concept and charge that it is "undemocratic" and inspired by Nasir's monolithic National Union. The official National Democratic party paper has also taken a stand against the plan, which it declared would not serve "democratic principles." Qasim, who has promised the resumption of party activities by 6 January, may favor the movement as a means of eliminating present political rivalries. He has not, however, given any overt indication that he endorses the single-party movement.

Qasim has resurrected the old fertile crescent plan, originally proposed by Nuri Said in December 1942, which envisions the union of Iraq, Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. Arab nationalists have long attacked this plan as "imperialist," but Qasim has stated that "now this plan is a national one--Iraq has been liberated." This scheme would make Baghdad a center of power in the Middle East rivaling Cairo. [REDACTED]

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